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# Estimation of Demand for Mortgage Loans Using Loan-level Data

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Ozhegov, Evgeniy M.

National Research University Higher School of Economics  
Center for Empirical Analysis of Industrial Organization



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# Outline

- Demand for loans
- Background
- Econometric model
- Discussion



# Demand for Loans

- ❑ Probability of credit contract agreement;
- ❑ Credit contract terms when agreed:
  - ❑ Loan amount (or Loan-to-Value);
  - ❑ Interest rate;
  - ❑ Maturity;
  - ❑ Downpayment.
- ❑ All are functions of:
  - ❑ Socio-demographic characteristics of borrower;
  - ❑ Terms of credit program (contract terms limits);
  - ❑ Desired property;
  - ❑ Macrovariables;
  - ❑ Expected loan performance:
    - ❑ Probability of default and loss given default for borrower;
    - ❑ Probability of prepayment and loss given prepayment for borrower.

Mortgage borrowing as a simultaneous decision-making process of borrower and credit organization generates **endogeneity**.

Follain (1990):

1. How much to borrow;
2. If and when to refinance;
3. Choice of mortgage instrument.

Rachlis, Yezer (1993):

1. Borrower's application;
2. Borrowers's selection of mortgage terms;
3. Lender's endorsement;
4. Borrower's default.

Sequential process generates **sample selection**.

Phillips, Yezer (1996), Ross (2000):

1. Borrower's application and selection of mortgage terms;
2. Lender's endorsement;
3. Borrower's default.

# Econometric Model

## 1. Instrumental variables for endogenous demographics:

$$D^{en} = Z_D \beta_D + e_D$$

$D^{en}$  – vector of endogenous socio-demographic characteristics,  
 $Z_D$  – Instrumental variables for demographics.

## 2. Modeling the probability of application:

$$y_1 = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } D\beta_D^1 + M\beta_M^1 + e_1 \geq \alpha_1 \\ 0, & \text{if } D\beta_D^1 + M\beta_M^1 + e_1 < \alpha_1 \end{cases}$$

$y_1 = 1$  is an application decision,

$D = (D^{ex}, \hat{D}^{en})$  – vector of exogenous demographics and fitted endogenous demographics,

$M$  – macrovariables.

3. Modeling the probability of endorsement for all applied:

$$y_2 = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } D\beta_D^2 + M\beta_M^2 + E[e_2|y_1 = 1] \geq \alpha_2 \\ 0, & \text{if } D\beta_D^2 + M\beta_M^2 + E[e_2|y_1 = 1] < \alpha_2 \end{cases}$$

$y_1 = 1$  is an endorsement decision.

4. Choice of loan amount limit for all endorsed:

$$\bar{L} = D\beta_D^{\bar{L}} + M\beta_M^{\bar{L}} + E[e_L|y_2 = 1]$$

$\bar{L}$  is a decision on loan limit.



# Econometric Model

5. Modeling the probability of contract agreement:

$$y_3 = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } D\beta_D^3 + M\beta_M^3 + \hat{L}\beta_L^3 + E[e_3|y_2 = 1] \geq \alpha_3 \\ 0, & \text{if } D\beta_D^3 + M\beta_M^3 + \hat{L}\beta_L^3 + E[e_3|y_2 = 1] < \alpha_3 \end{cases}$$

$y_3 = 1$  is an agreement decision;

$\hat{L}$  is a fitted value of loan amount limit.

6. Choice of credit terms and property:

$$\begin{cases} C_i = D\beta_D^{C_i} + M\beta_M^{C_i} + C_{-i}\beta_{C_{-i}}^{C_i} + V\beta_V^{C_i} + F\beta_F^{C_i} + E[e_{C_i}|y_3 = 1, C \in \bar{C}] \\ V = D\beta_D^V + M\beta_M^V + C\beta_C^V + F\beta_F^V + E[e_V|y_3 = 1, C \in \bar{C}] \end{cases}$$

$C = (C_i, C_{-i})$  is a vector of contract terms (Loan amount, Maturity, Downpayment, Interest rate),

$\bar{C}$  is a feasible set of contract terms determined by credit program,

$V$  is a property value,

$F$  is a property characteristics.



## 7. Modeling the probability of contract events:

$$y_4 = k, \text{ if } D\beta_D^4 + M\beta_M^4 + \hat{C}\beta_C^4 + \hat{V}\beta_V^4 + A\beta_A^4 + E[e_4|y_3 = 1] \in \mathcal{L}_k$$

$y_4 = k$  is a fact of  $k$ -th credit event,

$\hat{C}$  and  $\hat{V}$  are fitted values of credit terms and property value,

$A$  is a loss given  $k$ -th event.

Sequential decisions

$$y_1 = \begin{cases} 1, & \text{if } X\beta_X^1 + e_1 \geq \alpha_1 \\ 0, & \text{if } X\beta_X^1 + e_1 < \alpha_1 \end{cases}$$

$$y_2 = Z\beta_Z^2 + E[e_2|y_1 = 1]$$

Since  $y_1 = g(X\beta_X^1, F(e_1))$  then

$$E[e_2|y_1 = 1] = \psi(X\beta_X^1, F(e_1), F(e_2))$$

Since  $e_1$  and  $e_2$  are independent then

$$y_2 = Z\beta_Z^2 + \psi(X\beta_X^1, F(e_1)) + e_2$$

# Approaches to Sample Selection Correction

Depends on  $F(e_1)$ :

If  $e_1 \sim N(0, \sigma_1)$  then standart Heckman:

$$\square y_2 = Z\beta_Z^2 + \rho * IMR\left(X\widehat{\beta}_X^1\right) + e_2$$

If  $F(e_1)$  is undefined then use semi-parametrics:

- $\square \psi$  is a function on  $X\widehat{\beta}_X^1$  (polynomial or etc.);
- $\square$  difference-in-difference.



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# Discussion

1. Full rationality of agents causes simultaneity in all decisions.
2. Credit history is unobservable.



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# Thank you for attention

E-mail: [tos600@gmail.com](mailto:tos600@gmail.com)